Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright discusses what Kosovo should do in the first 120 days after independence. May 2007, Rockefeller Brothers, New York.

Russia turns lights off

Russia explicitly confirms the veto at the Security Council. What next? Possible divison? Possibly. Though that only is too simple to be true. A second Yugoslav-type war? Not likely. But as I say, absence of war does not necessarily mean peace. A series of prolonged conflicts in the region will more likely be the case. Virtually everybody in the Balkans will end up a loser.

Wish us luck!

Who's up for more talks?

I'm putting below UNOSEK's latest document which it otherwise published in .doc enforcing once again the belief of an existing West/Bill Gates conspiracy against Serbia. This document also seems to answer those that want more talks.

The Status Process

(updated 14 March)

The SE and the DSE paid their first visit to the parties and the region in November 2005, visiting Pristina and Belgrade, as well as the neighbouring capitals of Tirana, Podgorica and Skopje. Since then, the Special Envoy, his Deputy and senior staff members of UNOSEK have made frequent visits to the region.

In the course of 2006, UNOSEK has held 15 rounds of direct talks between the Belgrade and Pristina negotiating teams.

Fourteen of theses rounds of talks have focused on decentralization, the protection of cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo, economic issues, and the protection of community rights.

In addition, the SE presided over direct talks with the Serbian and Kosovo leadership in Vienna on 24 July 2006. President Boris Tadić and Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica led the delegation of Serbia, while President Fatmir Sejdiu led the Kosovo Team of Unity. The meeting gave each party the opportunity to present at the highest level its view of the future of Kosovo to the other, as well as to the international community, represented both by UNOSEK and by observers from the CG, the EU and NATO.

Listing of Direct Talks between the Belgrade and Pristina Delegations

• Meeting of the Serbian and Kosovo leadership in Vienna (24 July)
• Eight meetings related to decentralization: (20-21 February, 17 March, 3 April, 5 May, 19 July, 7 August, 7 September and 15 September)
• Three meetings related to the protection of cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo: ( 23 May, 18 July and 8 September)
• Two meetings related to community rights: (8 August and 8 September)
• One meeting related to economic issues: (31 May)

In addition to these direct talks between the parties, since January 2006, 26 UNOSEK-led expert missions have visited Belgrade and Pristina to talk separately to the parties on various issues.

Seemingly, since November 2005, the SE and his Deputy have been meeting extensively with other key players in the process. Those have included briefings to the Security Council (4 March, 13 July and 22 September 2006); meetings with the CG, EU Foreign Ministers, and other international actors, including NATO and the OSCE.

On 25 January 2007, the Special Envoy met the Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon in Paris to brief him on the latest developments in the status process and share with him the proposal. The next day, the Special Envoy met in Vienna with the Contact Group (CG) members and also shared the content of his proposal, as part of the regular consultations and close cooperation process between UNOSEK and the CG.

On 2 February, the Special Envoy travelled to Belgrade and Pristina to present his draft Comprehensive proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement to both parties. In Belgrade, the proposal was handed over to President Boris Tadić of Serbia. In Pristina, the Special Envoy presented his proposal to President Fatmir Sejdiu and the Team of Unity.

The Special Envoy then invited both parties in Vienna to a series of meetings on the draft proposal. During a first round of talks, held between 21 February and 2 March, delegations reviewed the whole document. UNOSEK then revised its initial draft and the Special Envoy invited the highest representatives of both parties to attend a High-level meeting in Vienna on 10 March. Belgrade delegation was led by President Boris Tadic and Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and Pristina´s Team of Unity was led by President Fatmir Sejdiu. Representatives of the Contact Group, EU and NATO also participated in the meeting.

At the end of the High level meeting, the Special Envoy observed that there was no will from the parties to move away from their previously stated positions. Left with no doubt that the parties’ respective positions on Kosovo’s status did not contain any common ground to achieve an agreement and that no amount of additional negotiation would change that fact, the Special Envoy concluded that the potential of negotiations was exhausted. He announced his intention to finalise his proposal for submission to the UN Security Council in the course of the month of March

On 14 March, Deputy Special Envoy Albert Rohan went to New York to hand over to the Secretary-General the Final Comprehensive proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement, as well as the Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s Future Status.

USIP: Kosovo: What Can Go Wrong?

by Daniel Serwer, Yll Bajraktari, and Christina Parajon

Conclusion: Multilateral when we Can, Unilateral if we Must

There are many things that can go wrong in the days and months ahead for Kosovo. There are forces working for delay and ambiguity, which will incite violence. The time has come for clarity and alacrity.

Given Serbia’s effort to cause further delay and uncertainty, along with the EU penchant for slowness and Russia’s reluctance to allow a clear UNSC decision, the United States needs to consider its options if a negotiated, multilateral solution proves impossible within the next few months. In that event, the Ahtisaari proposal will be a dead letter—Serbia cannot expect its implementation if there is no Security Council resolution.

If Kosovo were to remain unrecognized, it would then have a status comparable to that of Gaza or the West Bank, with all that implies in terms of instability and prospects for violence. Only U.S. leadership in moving quickly to recognize Kosovo—along with as many other countries as possible—could prevent rapid deterioration of such a situation. While the NATO forces stationed in Kosovo can no doubt keep the lid on for a while, that is only a temporary solution—one that will not stand firm if 1.8 million Albanians decide to march.

The full briefing at the source

Serbia asks much, loses more

Serb side, on the negotiations for Kosovo in Vienna, has requested more than it was possible, losing this way even what could be won, Serbia newspaper Blic cites the words of a foreign diplomat.

The diplomat says that many of the requests made were done to satisfy the public in Serbia and, as an example for this statement, mentions the request for Serb police to return to Kosovo.

"This has had an additional negative effect on Albanian side. They then became intolerable even on issues where an agreement could have been reached," has said the foreign diplomat who requested to remain anonymous.

Draskovic: Russia has not promised veto on Kosovo

Russia has never promised it will use the veto on Security Council due to Kosovo, Serbia Foreign Minister, Vuk Draskovic, has told Beta news agency.

"At this moment, positions of Serbia and Russia are on the same rails...But I believe that you cannot bet on it, in the war for the defense of Serbia's territorial integrity, to look only on Russia's veto", said Draskovic.

He said that Russia has made it clear that it will not support the solution proposed for the status of Kosovo if it clashes with Russia's interests and if both parties don't agree on it, but "it hasn't ventured further".

"I know that Russia, like never before, has signaled that there is a veto possibility...but it's something else to say 'we won't support the solution, and another thing to say that we will act against it," has said Foreign Minister, Vuk Draskovic.