Democracy is dirty. For people from totalitarian regimes to whom it is sold as the salvation, disillusion is the inevitable turn of events. One argument that optimists in the West make is that it takes time to build one. True, but even long experiences with democracy will not a guarantee continuous decent government. For the Balkans, the question that often comes to mind is whether you can trust the crowd to make an intelligent choice. When the choice made turns out to have been the wrong one, will the disappointment result in detachment from politics, violent anarchy, or a
lesson learnd for the masses on the road to long–term democratic nirvana?

Some countries, Italy being the leader, seem to be stuck in perpetual political instability. And although economic repercussions of such instability are certainly there, there are no hurtful effects on the fate of the country. This unfortunately cannot be said of Serbia and Albania. In the first, the government is stuck at a such a precarious position that Milosevic’s Socialists control the fate of government while Kostunica’s and Tadic's factions that run government fight over two different visions of Serbia. Radicals of Seselj are so strong that the government cannot afford any unpopular move with the public.

In Albania, the political fault lines are so deep that political violence is not unheard of. Nano and Berisha, the two main political leaders, represent two deeply divided but artificial views of the country from which Albania needs to move from. Albania desperately needs new faces, centrists and technocrats rather that arrogant militants creating divisions out of the blue.

So where does Kosova fit in all this? Well, disillusion has set in. The pervasive idea is that the lesser thieves get the votes. Party control is concentrated in Prishtina in the hands of the political machines. Concrete political programs are rare, opposition is often just for the sake of opposition, and political appointments are of questionable quality, if not outright corrupted.
It is under these circusmstances that the two PM with military backgrounds, Agim Ceku and Ramush Haradinaj, won outright popularity. Haradinaj's track record was cut short, but Ceku must prove himself soon in cleaning house or will be just another ineffective leader on the list.

On the other hand, the two coaltion parters, LDK and AAK are falling apart. Death of President Rugova intesified the split that already existed in LDK. Indictment of AAK leader Haradinaj weakened AAK, an amalgamate of small political factions that he put together through sheer personalitiy.

The two opposition parties, Hashim Thaqi's PDK and Veton Surroi's ORA , have been a loud opposition. ORA is probably the most liberal of all parties in Kosova. Veton Surroi's personality has gathered a new breed of leaders that, contrary to the norm, have entered politics after some achievement in their personal lives. ORA has allowed its members considerable freedom maintaining its initial status as a political list rather than an old fashioned party organization. Yet, Veton Surroi's personality goes against him and ORA. With his smarts, he is seen as arrogant, rich, and having imposed himself on the political scene at delicate times in Kosova's history (a great contribution, nonetheless, I believe).

Last month, the richest Albanian, Swiss-Kosovar Behxhet Pacolli announced the creation of his own party. It is not clear what he will bring to the table, but someone with strong experience in investing in post-communist markets will be a great addition to the spectrum. His entrance, altough low key so far, will force voters and established politicians realize that there is more than three choices. Reform or lose.

Now all we need is for open voting lists. So far the lists have been closed, with the OSCE and the big parties being the only supporters of such a scheme . OSCE saw in the system an opportunity for an indirect control on the quality of candidates - if the list consists of undesirables, it is easy to put pressure on the party leaders to clean it up rather have to go against the democratic choice of the electorate afteward. But those with key inside connections made it to the head of the list leaving huge potential in those parties out of government. Such structures also keep the mavericks from undermining party's leadership by establishing a strong bond of ownership between those put on the lists and those that created the lists. Despite the genuice concern of OSCE coming from previous experience in other parts of the Balkans, ultranationalism or minority bashing was never a problem with Kosova's politicians. Because OSCE with its policy prevented the normal political development of Kosova, today we are faced with party-clickques entrenched in corruption and untransparency.

Unrelated, but had to put it here. From B92