The worse it gets the better

Preparing the ground for the upcoming talks, Serb government has issued an ultimatum to Serbs in Kosova to allegedly “stop receiving salaries from one of the governments”. Faced between choosing the governments, Serbs are likely to choose Belgrade since among other things Belgrade pays better than Prishtina.

B92 reported that "Kosovo Coordination Centre demanded that the Serbian workers working in local self-government, health and educational institutions in Kosovo break their contracts with UNMIK concerning the money received from the Kosovo budget."
According to KCC, this is a matter of merely playing fair and fixing "legal disagreements, for example, that someone has two employers at the same time." One has to wonder why it took KCC so long to figure it out that feeding from two mothers is unfair. Or maybe unfairness is not an issue at all.

During the first meeting in Vienna, Lutfi Haziri, Kosova minister for local governance, brought up the subject of 17,000 Serbs receiving some type of salary from Kosova government, which he probably argued implies some sort of acceptance by Serbs of the Prishtina authority. But in Vienna or another conference that follows it the main argument from both sides will be that the sides cannot trust each other and that they need the maximum assurances to protect themselves from the other. For Albanians, this translates into independence from Serbia, including a UN seat that will guarantee its safety in the case of another future invasion by Serbia, which Serbia has not explicitly denied. For Serbs, not trusting Prishtina translates into local governance along with “horizontal integration and connection” with Serbia, which, they argue is the only way for the survival of Serbs in Kosova. As Kristian, a commentator on Kosovareport.com noted, “the main goal of the Serbs is to get the most concessions from the [W]est. By stalling they have more ammunition to get more guarantees from the [W]est. Its simple hold out and you shall receive more.” Serbs also threaten that if they are not granted their wish, they will pack and go, but that will be the subject for another post.

In a way, Serb policy towards Kosova is similar to that of the late President Rugova's policy towards Serbia: total withdrawal into a form of self-imposed isolation away from state institutions. Taking part in Belgrade institutions would have meant tacit approval for an authority which Albanians until 1999 considered rightfully illegitimate and terrorizing in Kosova. Serbs, with some exceptions, have taken the same stance towards the Prishtina government since then. But similarities end there.

One would be inclined to think that if non-cooperation and path of "resistance" towards central authority worked for Albanians, it might as well work for Serbs. Yet the ridiculous time it has taken for the issue to come to a resolution since 1999 has cost Serbs heavily. Most young Serbs have moved to Serbia in pursuit of higher education, more plentiful jobs, and a better urban life, all of which are limited for the ghettoized Serbs in Kosova. The old that remain behind probably have a negative population growth.

Kosova Serb leader, who were mostly members of the Socialist Party and shock troops of Milosevic's policy in Kosova until the last day, were the first to leave at the end of NATO campaign. In their view, Kosova either had to be Albanian or Serb. They played it to the last card and when the results were clear in June 1999, were the first to pack and leave. Being at the forefront of a corrupt neo-colonial apparatus, and maybe because they realized that the game was being played to the last card, they had already bought second and third houses in Belgrade and Montenegrin Riviera. Chances are that Albanians will ask for the heads of each of these people through courts or otherwise if they ever attempt to come back and put themselves into leadership positions. They were the public face of Serbia in Kosova ruling majorities of up to 97% Albanian through their whim and holding important economic and security positions. Sending these same people to talks with Albanians will be considered the outmost offense and lead to nowhere on the reconciliation front.

So here we are with the Kosova Serbs in a state of outmost confusion and without any leadership that would be worth mentioning. They are at the hands of Belgrade politics, which has repeatedly valued territory over population. Belgrade encourages them to hold out for the day when Serbia will return, and they in turn vote overwhelmingly for Seselj’s ultranationalists. It encourages them to hold on to the all or nothing idea, which in the eyes of Albanians makes them clearly the reason and the spearhead of any potential future threat from Serbia. It stops them from asking forgiveness for the role they played in the 90’s and especially during the war, which would pave the way for reconciliation. It stops them from joining the Kosovo Police Service and the Kosovo Protection Corps, the very same bodies that could very well do something to protect them.

I don’t expect K-Serbs to become exemplary citizens of Kosova. But they certainly can do things that would improve their status.